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4.1  Introduction 
Taxation and regulation command the attention of economists both as policy 
instruments and as objects of study in their own right. We want to know how 
taxes and regulations affect the behavior of individuals and firms. We also want 
to know why governments  adopt particular taxes and regulations. The trade- 
offs between taxation  and regulation  are often  a part  of policy  analysis. In 
international trade, for example, we consider a tariff  (a tax) and a quota (a 
regulation) as potential policy  substitutes or complements. In environmental 
economics pollution can be limited by a tax on output or by  emission controls, 
equipment  standards, or pollution permits (all regulations). But interactions 
between taxation and regulation are rarely considered when we try to explain 
why governments adopt certain policies. Governments, after all, impose taxes 
to raise revenue, and it is seldom clear how the desire to raise revenues is, or 
might be, related to its desire to change behavior (with the obvious exception 
of sin taxes). 
When governments derive significant tax revenues from an industry or activ- 
ity that they also regulate extensively, the relationship between taxation and 
regulation  could potentially  play a prominent role in explaining government 
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behavior. Our attention was drawn to the problem in our preliminary investiga- 
tion of  state government revenues from banks in the eastern seaboard states in 
the early nineteenth century. We found that several states derived close to half 
their revenue from bank sources-taxes  on bank capital, dividends on bank 
stock, and the like-while  other states received little or no revenue from bank 
sources (Sylla, Legler, and Wallis 1987).  Because state governments were also 
chartering banks and regulating the banking industry, we decided to examine 
more closely  the connections  between  taxation  and regulation  of  banks.  To 
anticipate our results, what we found in a larger sample of nineteenth-century 
state governments is a striking connection between not only the level but the 
type of revenue derived from bank sources and the way in which the banking 
system in each state was regulated. 
We  believe that the early American  state-chartered banking  industry is an 
example of  a more general  phenomenon. When  a government  imposes  any 
non-lump-sum  tax  (e.g., a per  unit tax or an ad valorem  tax), it  acquires  a 
“fiscal interest” in promoting the industry’s output or sales, or both. The gov- 
ernment’s fiscal interest will depend upon what it is taxing. If the government 
taxes profits, it acquires an interest in larger profits. If it owns stock in a firm, 
it acquires a fiscal interest in raising the profits, and dividends, of  that particu- 
lar firm. If the state taxes inputs or outputs, it acquires a fiscal interest in larger 
inputs or outputs. 
Political economy explanations of regulation usually focus on a set of con- 
flicting interests, competing within  the constraints  of a political  system that 
operates to diminish some interests and magnify others. We ask what happens 
when we consider the financial interests of the government itself, an interest 
that hardly needs representation at all. Our answer is that it matters a lot. The 
fiscal  interest  of  state  governments  clearly  mattered  for  early-nineteenth- 
century banking regulation. Nineteenth-century state governments relied heav- 
ily on revenues from specific businesses, such as banks, railroads, canals, and 
incorporations, and similar fiscal interests may have exerted an effect on regu- 
latory policies  in those industries as well.  We  consider the banking case in 
detail. 
The idea that the fiscal interest of  the  state affects regulatory policy  (and 
vice versa) has  many  potential  applications  in economic history.  We  begin, 
therefore, with a very general “model” of fiscal interest. The detailed study of 
nineteenth-century banking that follows is, in part, a test of the hypothesis and, 
in part, an explanation of the banking structure. We do  not claim that the fiscal- 
interest  model explains  all interstate differences  in banking  regulation.  The 
voluminous literature on banking provides a number of important explanations 
for that. Instead, we are trying to show that the fiscal interests of state govern- 
ments were one of several important determinants  of banking regulation. By 
doing so, we can illuminate both how fiscal interests interact with regulatory 
policy and add a new dimension to our understanding  of  nineteenth-century 
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4.2  A Model of Fiscal Interest 
The behavior  of  government is the outcome of  myriad  different  interests 
competing to control the spending, taxing, borrowing, and regulatory powers 
of the state. Fiscal interests are only one interest. Without being specific about 
the other interests, we simply assume that governments maximize something, 
whether  that  something  is political  support, or monetary  income for politi- 
cians, or stability for the bureaucracy. What the government maximizes is an 
issue of  great interest and importance, but we are not going to address it here. 
For our purposes we simply assume that the government, however constructed, 
has some interests. It must decide, for example, how much to tax and spend, 
which it does as follows: 
(1)  max m-  = U(X)  -  C(V) -  h(X -  V), 
where X  is expenditures,  V is revenues, and  U(.)  and C(.)  are dollar-valued 
utility and cost functions. The conclusions drawn from this type of model are 
simple and obvious. Governments maximize net benefits by equating the mar- 
ginal benefit of spending another dollar with the marginal cost of raising an 
additional dollar of taxes. 
Regulatory policy differs from expenditure and revenue decisions, because 
its political effects need not be related to levels of revenue or expenditure. A 
regulation can have a large effect on behavior at very low levels of expenditure, 
or a small effect on behavior at very high levels of expenditure. Including regu- 
lation in the government’s objective function, where R represents the regulation 
variable, produces 
(2)  max 7~ = U(X,R) -  C(W) -  h(X -  V). 
Whether a regulatory policy has any fiscal effects will depend on whether 
dV/dR is zero, that is, whether regulation affects tax revenues. 
Of course, regulation can rarely be represented by a number, and the interac- 
tion between regulation and tax revenues is rarely straightforward. Regulation 
comes in  many  different  forms. Banking  regulation  included, among other 
things, controls on entry, note issue, capital  requirements, accounting prac- 
tices, and ownership structure. Revenues from bank sources included taxes on 
bank capital, taxes on bank dividends, taxes on bank clerks, dividends paid on 
bank stock, and bonus payments for the creation or renewal of a bank’s charter. 
Regulation and taxation of  other industries were equally complicated. We be- 
gin with a simple case. 
Assume that the government imposes a per unit tax, t, on an industry’s out- 
put, Q, so that revenues are 
V = tQ. 
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variable, R, represents the number of firms allowed into the industry.’ If indus- 
try output is positively related to the number of  firms, then industry output will 
also be related to the regulatory policy, dQ/dR > 0. 
What will be the optimal regulatory policy? In combination  equations (2) 
and (3a) suggests that both the tax rate, t, and the regulatory policy, R, will be 
determined endogenously: the regulatory policy and tax policy depend on each 
other. But what happens to the cost of changing R as t increases? Clearly, as 
governments impose a higher tax rate on output, the fiscal effects of changing 
the regulatory policy become higher. For example, if there are political benefits 
to be gotten from restricting entry by rewarding influential political supporters 
with market power, the cost of creating market power rises as t increases. The 
higher the tax rate, the greater is the state’s incentive to allow entry. 
This result is very simple. Even though we often think of the power to tax 
as the power to destroy, whenever the government establishes a tax on the out- 
put of  an industry it also acquires an interest in increasing that output.’ The 
interest is generated  by  the marginal benefits  of expenditures.  That is, every 
interest group contending for more expenditures benefits when the government 
raises another dollar of tax revenues. 
But this is far from the whole story. Governments  raise revenues  in  ways 
other than output taxes. Direct ownership of a firm or an industry, for example, 
gives the government a completely different fiscal interest. This case is particu- 
larly relevant for nineteenth-century  banking, when  states owned banks and 
banking systems. Now tax revenues are no longer tQ, but 
where p  is output price and c(Q)  is the industry (or firm) cost function. Profits 
flow directly to the state, and the tax rate becomes the share in total profits that 
accrues to the state. 
In the case of government ownership, entry plays a different role from the 
case of a tax on industry output (or inputs). By limiting entry the government 
restricts competition  and allows the firm to charge a higher price. While it is 
still the case that dQ/dR > 0, it may no longer be the case that dV/dR > 0 
(recall that R is the number of firms in the industry determined by the regula- 
tion). It is probably the opposite, that is, dV/dR < 0, since more competition 
will tend to reduce profits, ceteris paribus. Under this tax structure, the higher 
the tax rate the greater is the state’s incentive to reduce entry. 
Regulatory  policy  and taxation  are  still determined endogenously in this 
case, but it is clear (depending on the structure of  demand in an industry) that 
a government that imposes a tax on  output  will choose a different  level of 
1. It is awkward to represent the level of regulation with a number. In our example, as R  in- 
2. This assumes, of course, that the purpose of  the tax in the first place was not to reduce output. 
creases, the regulation on entry becomes less stringent. 
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regulation, that is, the number of firms in the industry, than a government that 
owns an equity interest in the industry. Expected combinations of fiscal interest 
and regulation are marked with Xs in table 4.1. States that tax output should, 
ceteris paribus, encourage many firms to enter to increase output. States that 
own  firms outright  should discourage  entry. States that both  tax  output  and 
own equity will fall somewhere in between.3  These theoretical  insights form 
the basis for our analysis of early nineteenth-century banking. 
4.3  Balancing Fiscal Interest and Political Economy 
Early  nineteenth-century  American  banking  provides  a good example of 
how a state’s fiscal interest in an economic activity affects the manner in which 
it is regulated. From their beginnings  in the  1780s, banks were corporations 
chartered by governments. Their very existence depended on the favor of poli- 
ticians and government officials, and every state retained the sovereign prerog- 
ative of chartering banks. 
Tension between a state’s fiscal interest in banking and the political economy 
of bank regulation were resolved in a variety of ways. As a consequence US. 
history, especially before the Civil War, generated richly variegated outcomes 
across states in banking development, fiscal interests, and banking regulations. 
Regulatory regimes ranged from free entry to monopoly, and even to prohibi- 
tion  of  chartered banks.  Fiscal  interests  encompassed a variety of  taxes  on 
banks, partial or total state ownership of banks with resulting  stakes in their 
earnings, and the ability to use the chartering power to direct bank lending and 
investment toward public purposes. 
The state financial data we have gathered allow us to focus more closely on 
the state’s fiscal interest. We can answer some questions about the wide variety 
of state banking experiences and regulatory approaches that all observers find 
in the antebellum  years. Table 4.2 shows just how  important revenues from 
bank sources were to states before the Civil War.4 
Table 4.1  The Relationship between Fiscal Interest and Regulatory Policy 
Entry Policy/Regulatory Policy 
Revenue Source/ 
Fiscal Interest  Encourage entry  Limit entry  Restrict entry 





3. There are more ways to derive revenue from banks than taxing output or owning equity. These 
4. The figures in  the table are reliable in terms of  general magnitudes but are still preliminary 
different ways of raising revenue will be discussed in more detail in later sections of the paper. 
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What we have called “bank revenues” are revenues, both tax  and nontax, 
that can be identified specifically with banking. For example, a state may have 
had a general property  tax, and a specific property  tax on banks. We  would 
identify the latter as a tax on banks, but not the former. This is, after all, what 
we are interested in looking at: the specific revenues derived from banks, be- 
cause they were banks. 
The series for each state begins when it became a state. Every state data set 
has  some  missing  years.  The tables,  therefore,  present  “decade averages,” 
where the averages are for the years for which we have data, not for all years 
in the decade. 
Table 4.2 shows that many  states made do in the nineteenth  century  with 
little or no reliance on bank revenues, whereas other states relied heavily  on 
bank revenues. We  need to be careful, however, about the terms “heavy” and 
Table 4.2  Bank Revenues as Share of Total Net Revenues (decade averages) 
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Notes: Blank cells in the table are decades without data. The decades run from the year ending in 
five to the year ending in four, that is. “1830” is 1825 to  1834. The “Average” row is the simple 
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“large.” Some states-Connecticut,  Massachusetts,  Rhode Island,  Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, and North Carolina-typically  received at least a third, and in a 
few decades close to half, of their revenues from bank sources. Another group 
of  states-Maryland,  New  York,  Vermont,  and Virginia-flirted  with  bank 
revenues that approached 10 percent of total revenues. Only the states in the 
first group are heavily dependent on business revenues on a consistent basis, 
but the second group was (sometimes) dependent on bank revenues. 
In none of the states, however, can the level of bank revenues be said to be 
large by any contemporary measure. Using Weiss’s ( 1992) conjectural income 
estimates for the early nineteenth  century and standard income estimates for 
the later nineteenth century, state government revenues were in the neighbor- 
hood of 0.3 percent of income in 1800 and about 1.25 percent of income in 
1900.’ Even in states where bank revenues were very important to the state’s 
budget, tax  rates on banks were probably very  low. State governments  were 
simply smaller actors on the economic stage than they were to become later. 
The states that relied heavily on bank revenues may have done so only be- 
cause they had  small total revenues relative  to other states. In that case the 
relatively  large share of bank revenues might be a reflection  of the small de- 
nominator  in the ratio rather  than  large bank  revenues. Examination of  per 
capita revenues, however, suggests that this is not the case. States with large 
bank revenue shares range from those with the highest levels of real per capita 
revenues (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland) to those with low lev- 
els of real per capita revenues (Delaware). 
Table 4.2 tells us that banks were often an important source of state revenue, 
but little more. What follows in section 4.4 are detailed histories of  banking 
regulation in nine states. Several issues affect how we present those histories. 
They involve the role of endogeneity and causation in our model. 
We  explicitly modelled  the choice of  tax  policy  and regulatory  policy  as 
simultaneous.  States jointly  maximize the difference between the benefits of 
spending money and regulating industries and the costs of raising revenues and 
regulating those same industries. In terms of table 4.1, the model cannot say 
whether a state will tax output and encourage entry or own a monopoly bank 
and eliminate entry. The model only suggests that states will array themselves 
along the diagonal. 
We do not explain why a state chooses to be at one end of the policy spec- 
trum or the other in this paper. To do that would require a full model of revenue 
structure and one of regulatory structure in addition to the model of the interac- 
tion between taxation and regulation we are examining in this paper. Because 
of the endogenous nature of  taxation and regulation,  causality  can  run both 
5. Weiss’s estimate for 1800 is $77 in 1840 dollars or $81 in 1880 dollars. If we take $0.35 as a 
reasonable middle ground for the per capita revenues from banks in  1800, the state government 
share of income is ,0043, or 0.4 percent. In 1900 per capita income was $300 in  1880 dollars and 
per capita revenues were somewhere in the neighborhood of $3 to $4, or between 1 and 1.3  percent 
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ways. A state may choose to restrict entry because it earns revenue from state 
ownership of  bank stocks. It might also end up owning bank stock because it 
wants to restrict entry into the banking industry to protect the profits of existing 
banks, and the existing banks pay for this privilege by selling the stock to the 
state on attractive termsh  We have little to say about why a state ends up with 
one policy or another. 
The endogeneity  issue raises  two other problems  that  can be  dealt  with. 
First, since taxation  and regulation  are endogenous,  the pairs of policy out- 
comes that we observe across the states may be the result of an unidentified 
third factor that we have not considered. For example, the northeastern  states 
were more commercially developed than the southern and western states. We 
would  expect  northern  states to have more banks  and more  bank  revenues, 
regardless of state fiscal policy. A pattern of regulation and taxation that varied 
systematically from north to south might have nothing to do with our explana- 
tion. Northeastern states might tax bank capital because there was a lot of bank 
capital to tax, and southern states might own lots of bank stock because that 
was the only way they could establish banks. High numbers of  northern banks 
might reflect high profits in banking rather than ease of entry in northern states, 
with the reverse true in the South. 
A second problem is related to a secular trend in corporation law, particu- 
larly banking incorporation. As one of us has argued (Sylla 1988), American 
banking was the first industry to enjoy general incorporation laws, such as the 
New York free banking law of  1838. By  1860 many states had some version 
of  a free banking law with easy incorporation. Perhaps what we are seeing is 
a  movement  from  equilibrium  policy  in  1800-state-owned  monopoly 
banks-to  another equilibrium  in  1860-an  open and competitive  banking 
industry. The movement along the diagonal in table 4.1, therefore,  might be 
purely fortuitous. 
We can deal with both of  these problems. We have dealt with the problem 
of  an unexamined  third  factor by  examining regulatory  structure and fiscal 
interest at the regional level. We chose three states from the Northeast, three 
from the South, and three from the West. The regional grouping was chosen to 
illustrate that the differences in banking structure across states wirhin each of 
the three regions are as substantial as the differences across the three regions. 
The association we find between taxation and regulation  was not due to re- 
gional differences in commercial or economic development. 
The secular trend in corporation law is important, but several of the states 
examined clearly indicate that more than a secular trend was at work. For ex- 
ample, Maryland owned bank  stock and restricted entry for a time; then sold 
its bank stock, taxed bank capital, and encouraged entry; and still later began 
to sell bank charters and once again restrict entry. There was a trend toward 
6. There is evidence of both kinds of behavior In the early nineteenth century. See the discussion 
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free incorporation, but there was also enough variation in state experience to 
determine that the relationship between tax structure and regulatory policy was 
not the result of a simple trend. 
4.4  Regional Banking Regulations: Differences among States 
In  1787 the  various  states took very  similar  approaches  to the  new  (for 
Americans) business of banking. During the early decades from 1781, when 
the first bank was chartered, to 18  11, when the first Bank of the United States 
lost its charter, banks were regarded everywhere as public utilities. In return 
for monopolistic franchises they were to perform public services such as pro- 
viding the paper currency that the states themselves could no longer provide 
because of constitutional prohibitions. They were also depositories and trans- 
ferrers of public funds. Usually there was only one bank in a town; only the 
very largest cities had two or three. 
The monopolistic privileges conferred by bank charters generated handsome 
profits  for banks.  Since politicians  and governments made these profits  pos- 
sible, why should they not share in them? The answer was obvious to a people 
who deemed government necessary and therefore knew that it had to be paid 
for, but who nonetheless were averse to taxation. Consider the results of the 
plan  for organizing  Pennsylvania’s  finances developed  by  the young  Albert 
Gallatin as a state legislator in 1791. The plan, aided by the federal assumption 
of state debts, produced a revenue surplus for the state. Decades later Gallatin 
wrote: 
The fear that this [the surplus] would be squandered by the legislature, was 
the principal  inducement  for chartering  the Bank of Pennsylvania,  with a 
capital of  two millions of dollars, of  which the state subscribed one half. 
This, and similar subsequent investments, enabled Pennsylvania to defray, 
out of the dividends, all the expenses of government without any direct tax 
during the forty ensuing years, and till the adoption of the system of internal 
improvement,  which  required  new  resources.  (Quoted in  Stevens  1898, 
46-47.) 
In our earlier paper we documented the fiscal interest of the oldest eastern- 
seaboard states in their banks (Sylla, Legler, and Wallis  1987). The evidence 
available to us then, incomplete as it was, indicated that these states as a group 
obtained, on average, about one-fifth of their ordinary revenues (net of loans) 
from banks. Most revenues took the form of taxes on banks or returns on state 
investment  in  banks.  There were  some instances  of  what  today  would  be 
termed “off budget” financing. States occasionally required, for example, that 
chartered banks provide various forms of financial aid to institutions and enter- 
prises that the states wanted to support. Banks financed activities the public 
wanted while governments avoided the need to fund them with taxes. Lotteries, 
also popular in this early era, performed a similar function in public finance. 130  John Joseph Wallis, Richard E. Sylla, and John B. Legler 
We  know  from  such  classics as Bray  Hammond’s  Banks and  Politics  in 
America from the Revolution to the Civil War (1957) that antebellum banking 
was highly politicized and that the outcome of the political process resulted in 
a wide variation across states. Hammond saw this as a result of battles between 
the commercial and industrial  entrepreneurs,  who  wanted  cheap credit, and 
those Jeffersonian idealists, farmers, and ordinary working folk, who wanted 
to keep America simple, upright, and free from the vicissitudes of bank credit. 
In Hammond’s view both sides in the battle failed to see that money, banking, 
and credit had to have a controller in the form of a central bank; he paid almost 
no attention to the state’s fiscal interest in banks. 
Table 4.3 illustrates the variety  of  banking experiences  and outcomes  for 
the nine states before the Civil War. The table shows the state shares of  US. 
population, the state shares of the number of banks, and shares of bank capital 
in 1820, 1830, 1 850, and 1860. The three northeastern states-Massachusetts, 
New York, and Pennsylvania-are  the largest of the commercial and industrial 
Northeast. The three  south  Atlantic  states-Maryland,  Virginia,  and  South 
Carolina-are  states of  the plantation-oriented,  slaveholding  South that con- 
tained important commercial centers. The three midwestern states-Ohio,  In- 
diana, and Missouri-are  part of the newly settled frontier regions. Together 
these nine states contained half or more of the nation’s population, banks, and 
bank capital at each of the four dates. 
The table indicates some striking, if unsurprising, contrasts. The three states 
of the Northeast had 25 to 30 percent of  the U.S. population and 40 to SO 
percent of the nation’s banks and bank capital throughout the antebellum pe- 
riod. The three southern states saw their combined population share cut in half 
between  1820 and  1860, but were able to maintain  a bank capital share that 
was near to, and in 1850 and 1860  actually above, their population share. Their 
share of U.S. banks was always lower than their share of population because 
they tended  to have larger banks and often banks with branches. The three 
western  states increased their shares of population,  banks, and bank  capital 
from  1820 to  1850. They about held their own in all three categories during 
the  1850s. But the share of population for these states greatly exceeded their 
share of banks and bank capital at all dates, and in two of the three states there 
were no chartered banks operating  in  1830. These data, taken  together,  are 
supportive of customary characterizations of the three U.S. regions in the ante- 
bellum era. 
Another, more interesting way of viewing the same data is presented in table 
4.4. Here we treat each of the three regional groupings as a separate unit and 
ask what were the differences among the three states in each group. We  find 
that the differences within each group of states, which are ostensibly similar in 
their level of economic development and in the nature of their state economies, 
is at least as great as the differences we find across the three regions. In  the 
Northeast, for instance, Massachusetts’s regional share of banks and bank capi- 
tal vastly exceeds its population share at all dates, while Pennsylvania’s share 
of the two banking variables is, after 1820, considerably less than its popula- 131  Interaction of  Taxation and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century U.S. Banking 
Table 4.3  Selected State and Regional Shares of US.  Totals, 1820-60 
1820  1830 
Population  Bank  Capital  Population  Bank  Capital 


























































































1850  1860 
Population  Bank  Capital  Population  Bank  Capital 













US.  Totals 
4.3  14.3 
13.4  22.5 
10.0  5.7 
27.6  42.5 
2.5  2.9 
4.8  4.3 
2.9  I .7 
10.2  8.9 
8.5  6.7 
4.3  1.6 
2.9  0.7 
15.7  9.0 





















































Sources; Population is taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975. The number of banks and the 
amount of bank capital for 1820 and 1830 are taken from Gilbart 1967,43-48; for 1850 and 1860 
from Sylla 1975,249-52. 
Notes; All dollar totals are in  millions of  current dollars. Each variable-population,  number of 
banks, and amount of  bank  capital-is  reported as a share of  the total population, number of 
banks, and bank capital in the entire United States in each year. 
tion share. New York is more like Pennsylvania in 1820  and 1830 but becomes 
more like Massachusetts in 1850 and 1860. 
In the South Maryland follows a pattern like that of Massachusetts-higher 
shares of banks and bank capital than population-and  then  becomes  more 
like New York. Virginia in  1820 starts out like Pennsylvania ends up in 1850 132  John Joseph Wallis, Richard E. Sylla, and John B. Legler 
Table 4.4  Within-Region Shares of Population, Number of Banks, and Bank 
Capital, Three Geographic Regions, 1820-60 
1820  1830 
Population  Bank  Capital  Population  Bank  Capital 
State  (%c)  (%)  (%I  (%  /o)  (%'c)  (%/o) 
Northeast 
MA  17.8  28.9  23.8  15.7  48.5  37.1 
NY  46.6  34.0  43.0  49.5  27.2  36.4 
PA  35.6  37.1  33.2  34.8  24.3  26.5 
MD  22.0  60.9  30.9  21.6  59.  I  38.0 
VA  50.8  17.4  31.8  50.4  18.2  33.9 
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and 1860, but ends up like Pennsylvania starts out in 1820. South Carolina is 
more like New York, with population  shares roughly equal to banking shares 
(although the  banking  shares decline slightly). In  the West, Ohio, the early 
developer in this frontier region, dominates the banking data at the first three 
dates but then slips in its regional banking shares during the 1850s, while Mis- 
souri exhibits striking increases in the banking shares in that decade. 
What explains the antebellum banking differences we find within the states 
of relatively homogeneous economic regions? We believe that it is mainly the 
result of differences in the fiscal interests each state developed in its banks and, 
as a consequence, in the approach each state took toward banking regulation, 
especially  the  way  each  state regulated  entry. The following  discussion  at- 133  Interaction of Taxation and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century U.S. Banking 
tempts to bring out the political and economic forces that led to the observed 
differences within each region. 
4.4.1  The Northeast 
Why did Massachusetts from 1820 to  1860 develop shares of  banks  and 
bank capital that vastly exceeded its share of population in the Northeast region 
and in the United States, as tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate? The answer, we think, 
lies in the Bay State’s decision to levy a 1 percent per annum tax on the capital 
of Massachusetts banks in  1812. The tax, which became the mainstay of the 
state’s revenue from then until the Civil War (Sylla, Legler, and Wallis 1987), 
gave the  state a fiscal interest  in the  growth  of  bank  capital. Massachusetts 
relied heavily on the bank capital tax throughout the antebellum period. 
hlassachusetts’s rapid growth in manufacturing and commerce was diffused 
among a large pool of small entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs wanted to set 
up their own banks and borrow from them-what  Naomi Lamoreaux (1  994) 
terms  “insider  lending.”  This  also  meant  a  large  increase  in  the  number 
of unit banks. In the Settlement of  1812, Massachusetts opted for “free-and- 
easy incorporation” (free entry) and the tax on capital (Handlin and Handlin 
1947, 175). 
Before  1812 the state’s banking policy  was more like the other states that 
chartered the nation’s earliest banks.’ Massachusetts was then an investor in, 
and dividend recipient from, banking monopolies akin to public utilities that 
issued hand-to-hand currency. In that period the state came to own one-eighth 
of the capital stock of  Massachusetts banks.  It protected its investment by  a 
reluctance to grant new charters, born of a fear that competition would lower 
the commonwealth’s return on investment. Except for Boston, towns received 
only one chartered bank, and unchartered private or “unauthorized” banking 
was restrained by law as early as 1799 (Handlin and Handlin  1947, 123). 
Why Massachusetts changed the nature of its fiscal interest in banks in 1812 
is not clear. The state was not facing a fiscal crisis at the time, although it did 
face political  pressures  from  those who wanted  charters for more banks  of 
issue. A tax on bank capital had been proposed on more than one occasion in 
earlier years by  not enacted. Perhaps the  growth of banks and bank  capital 
that was actually allowed, and the clamor for more, gradually increased the 
legislative interest in the revenue possibilities of such a tax. By 18  12 legislators 
apparently became convinced that banking privileges had to be shared. Even 
the old banks, an interest group invariably opposed to new entry, muted their 
opposition  because  to oppose  new  entrants  would  be  “hard  and  invidious” 
(Handlin and Handlin  1947, 124-30;  Bullock  1907, 26-30).  The old Puritan 
conscience may have been  at  work, too. In any case, after the Settlement of 
1812, the state proceeded to liquidate its bank stock to pay state debts, which 
it completed by  1820, and to freely charter banks when requested. It “consis- 
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tently brushed aside qualmish attempts to curb expansion” of banks and their 
note issues (Handlin and Handlin  1947, 174). 
One such attempt, or proposal, came from Nathan  Appleton  (1831), who 
attacked the bank tax as excessive, unwise, counterproductive, and pernicious. 
Appleton, for safety and soundness  reasons,  wanted  note issue restricted  to 
large, well-capitalized banks and limited to one-third of their capital. He ar- 
gued for a 3 percent tax on note circulation, to replace the  1 percent tax on 
capital without sacrificing revenue. (That revenue neutrality would have been 
true, as he did  not note, only if  all banks were  large and well capitalized.) 
Appleton apparently represented the views of the large Boston banks that had 
relatively more capital and relatively fewer notes in circulation than the small 
country banks. Such banks would  have benefited from lower taxation  under 
Appleton’s proposal, provided their note circulation  was less than  a third of 
their capital. But then the state would have less banknote currency than it did 
with the tax on bank capital. The legislature ignored his proposal, kept charter- 
ing banks when requests came in, and continued to tax their capital. 
Elsewhere in New England, Rhode Island also enacted a tax on bank capital. 
Rhode Island taxed capital at a lower rate than Massachusetts, but coupled it 
with higher rates on increases in the capital of existing banks and bonus taxes 
for newly issued charters. Like Massachusetts  it had many  small banks, had 
invested a large amount of capital in banking, and typically received a signifi- 
cant proportion of total revenue from its banks. Maine was a part of Massachu- 
setts when the 1812 tax on bank capital was instituted, and it maintained the 
tax  after statehood  in  1820. New  Hampshire taxed bank capital  at half  the 
Massachusetts  rate  starting at  1821 (Sylla, Legler, and Wallis  1987). In our 
view the fiscal-interest implications of  these measures go far in explaining the 
unusually  high  concentration  of  U.S.  banks  and bank capital  in antebellum 
New England. 
The key issues of the state’s fiscal interest in banking, and therefore of the 
way in which it might be led to regulate bank entry in pursuing that interest, 
are delineated by the example of Massachusetts. Hence, we may be briefer in 
discussing the other states in our sample. 
New  York is a most  interesting  case. What needs to be explained  is the 
Empire State’s retarded  development  of  banking  compared with Massachu- 
setts, revealed  in our data for 1820 and 1830, and then the catching up and 
attaining of a leading position in bank numbers and capital in 1850 and 1860. 
The explanation is straightforward. Like Massachusetts, New York developed 
a substantial investment interest in banks during the early period and then liq- 
uidated most of  its holdings by  1820. Unlike Massachusetts,  proposals for a 
tax on bank capital were defeated in the legislature in 1815, 1818, and 1819. 
Instead of developing a tax interest or maintaining an investment interest, New 
York “privatized” these interests for political purposes. 
Control of bank chartering  in the late 1810s passed into the hands of  the 
Albany Regency, the policy-making  committee of the New York Republican 135  Interaction of Taxation and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century U.S. Banking 
Party, headed  by  Martin  Van  Buren.  Control  over the banking system  was 
achieved  by  restraining  private banking  by  legislation  in  1818, and then in- 
serting a “two-thirds clause” in the state constitution of  1821-there  would be 
no charters without a two-thirds vote by the legislature. Charters went only to 
friends of the Regency. Political discipline was maintained by allowing legisla- 
tors to subscribe at par to initial offerings of bank stock, which then sold at a 
premium because of entry limitations. Between  1819 and  1828, a period of 
canal-related  growth in the state economy, only ten banks were chartered; in 
the same period Massachusetts  chartered  more than fifty. New  York’s canal- 
fund revenues were deposited in friendly banks, a forerunner of the Jacksonian 
policy on the federal level a decade later. 
Because bank charters were awarded for political correctness rather than on 
economic merit, bank defaults and failures became a problem for the Regen- 
cy’s continued domination. The solution was the Safety Fund, a bank-liability 
insurance plan proposed by Van Buren, then governor, in 1829. After that date, 
chartering activity picked up, but it was far less than the demand for charters. 
In  1836, for example, charters for ninety-three new banks were proposed, but 
only twelve were approved. Corruption in legislative chartering and the Panic 
of  1837 combined to defeat the  Regency  and the Republicans in  that year. 
When their opponents,  the Whigs, took office, they passed  the now famous 
New York Free Banking Act of  1838. Thereafter, New York caught up with 
and eventually surpassed the far smaller state of Massachusetts  in bank num- 
bers and capital (Seavoy 1982, chaps. 3-6). 
Pennsylvania lagged both Massachusetts and New York in antebellum bank- 
ing development, although the difference between  the Keystone and Empire 
States was minimal in  1820, as shown in table 4.4. The nature of the state’s 
fiscal interest in banking is an important part of the story. Pennsylvania was a 
large investor in its banks, for reasons discussed in the quotation from Gallatin 
above. Unlike Massachusetts and New York it maintained its investment inter- 
est into the early 1840s, when  its bankruptcy  forced it to liquidate its bank 
shares. Its fiscal interest was of  an investment nature-bank  dividends. In the 
words of an  1822 legislative committee, bank dividends were Pennsylvania’s 
“first and principal source of  revenue” (quoted in Hartz 1948, 90). Bank divi- 
dends accounted for roughly 40 percent of total revenues from 1795 to 1825, 
declining to 18 percent from 1825 to 1835, and disappearing after 1845. 
Pennsylvania’s fiscal interest in banks created incentives for the state to re- 
strict charters. This was recognized. An earlier legislative committee of 1807-8 
on charter proposals  noted, “Upon such applications  the stake the common- 
wealth already has in . . .  existing institutions ought always to be kept in view” 
(quoted in Hartz 1948,53-54). 
The state recognized  that these incentives were in conflict with the public 
interest more generously conceived to allow easier entry into banking. In the 
legislative session of 18  12-1 3, a resolution introduced in the legislature stated, 
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Whereas, the intimate connection and union of  pecuniary interests between 
a government and great monied  institutions, tends to create an influence, 
partial to the latter and highly injurious to the former. It being the duty of 
government to consult the general will and provide for the good of all, em- 
barrassments  must frequently be thrown in the way of the performance of 
this duty, when the government is coupled in interest with institutions whose 
rights are founded in monopoly, and whose prosperity depends on the exclu- 
sion and suppression of similar institutions. The government in such cases 
becomes identified with these establishments, and the means of  promoting 
and extending  commerce, manufactures,  and agriculture  equally  over the 
whole state for the general good are too often lost sight of by this dangerous 
and unnatural union. (Quoted in Schwartz 1987, 1  1 .) 
The resolution was defeated by legislators who looked after a different per- 
ception of  the public interest. 
Bank chartering in Pennsylvania from the 1790s to the 1840s was character- 
ized by bidding wars between the old banks, which wanted to keep newcomers 
out, and the new banks,  which wanted  to get in. Besides  arranging for the 
state to own bank shares, legislators discovered that  bonus taxes could also 
be collected. Whether a charter was approved depended on which party, the 
proponent  or the opponent,  made the most attractive offer to the  state. The 
most famous example occurred  in  1835, when a chastened Nicholas  Biddle 
desperately sought a Pennsylvania charter for the Bank of the United States, 
whose federal charter was about to expire. The bank’s lobbyist spent $128,000 
on legislative pressure, and in the end the bank, by the terms of the state charter, 
had to pay Pennsylvania a bonus of $2 million and grant the state a “tempo- 
rary” loan of  $1 million annually as well as a “permanent” loan of $6 million 
(Hartz 1948,55,64). 
Such terms could be extracted only if bank charters were restricted, so that 
the banks could recoup their payments in excess profits. Hence, the nature of 
Pennsylvania’s fiscal interest dictated a slow growth of banking in the state, 
relative to Massachusetts and, from the 1830s, to New York. 
The northeastern  states provide a very strong test of the fiscal-interest hy- 
pothesis. All three of these states contained major commercial sectors, all were 
leading industrial states, all had relatively high incomes. Each state began the 
nineteenth century with the same banking policy: charter a few banks as public 
utilities in which the state government owned a substantial equity interest. But 
the three states thereafter moved along divergent paths, paths that neatly trace 
the diagonal of  table 4.1. Massachusetts  taxed bank  capital and encouraged 
entry. Pennsylvania owned bank stock and discouraged entry. New York real- 
ized political gains from granting charters and moved through a middle ground 
until political forces displaced the Regency. Other regions show the same pat- 
tern, but imposed over a different background. 
4.4.2  The South 
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Massachusetts pattern of  a bank capital share well in excess of the population 
share. Virginia,  however, replicates the laggard pattern of Pennsylvania. The 
fiscal-interest motives for these differences  were similar to, but more mixed 
and muted that, those in the Northeast. 
Maryland, like other old states, created its initial fiscal interest in banks by 
investing  in them.  But the actual investment was not  high. The state, when 
granting bank charters, reserved the right to invest but seldom did so, and then 
only to a limited extent. There was no investment of state funds after 18  1 1. In 
the 1830s, when the demand for bank capital was great, the state sold its rights 
to subscribe to shares of newly chartered banks to private investors and pock- 
eted the cash for the treasury. Selling such rights was a streamlined method of 
capturing the value that arose from restricting the number of bank charters. 
In 1813 the state’s fiscal interest in banks began to change, as it did in Massa- 
chusetts in 1812. Old banks had their charters, due to expire in 1815, extended 
to 1835 on two conditions.  First, in keeping with the growing demand for inter- 
nal improvements, the renewal  charters directed the banks to subscribe to  a 
road-building fund, implementing a proposal that annually arose in the legisla- 
ture after 1803. Second, the charters required  the banks to pay an annual tax 
of $20,000 into a fund to support schools. In  1815 the tax was changed to an 
annual tax of twenty cents per hundred dollars of capital paid in. The school 
tax continued to 1863, yielding $30,000 to $40,000 per year. These measures 
shifted the state’s fiscal interest from one that benefited from restricting bank 
charters to one that benefited from having more banks and more bank capital. 
Banks chartered nearly doubled, from fourteen to twenty-seven, between  I8  12 
and 1819 (Fenstermaker  1965). But about half failed. Nonetheless, among its 
southern peer states, Maryland in  1820 and  1830 stood out for its dispropor- 
tionate banking development. 
Around 1830 Maryland caught the Pennsylvania bug and began to sell bank 
charters for bonus payments, reverting in part to its earlier fiscal interest. As in 
Pennsylvania, the bonuses that could be extracted, like the rights to subscribe 
to bank shares, depended on restricting the number of charters granted. In 1835 
an earlier monopoly granted to the existing banks of  Baltimore was renewed 
in return for bonuses  aggregating  $75,000; no new banks  were chartered in 
Baltimore  for more than a decade. In  1850 and  1860 our data indicate that 
Maryland  had  retreated  from being  a banking  leader in its region  to being 
merely average. 
In this respect Maryland traded places with South Carolina, whose regional 
share of capital and banks about matched its share of population  in 1820 and 
1830, but then increased to reach a disproportionate  level of bank capital in 
18.50 and 1860. South Carolina developed an interesting mixed system of pri- 
vate chartered banks located primarily in Charleston and a state-owned bank, 
the Bank of  the State of  South Carolina, headquartered  in  Charleston with 
branches throughout the state. The capital of the Bank of the State consisted 
of funds in the state treasury: thus it varied from year to year, usually in a range 
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in Charleston, but its main and intended purpose, in the eyes of  the planter- 
dominated legislature, was to extend credit facilities to planters in the interior. 
This  business  was  not  pursued  by  the  private,  merchant-oriented  banks  of 
Charleston. 
South Carolina moved to  the  banking  forefront  of  its region in the  mid- 
1830s when the Charleston branch of the Bank of the United States was forced 
to close. It was succeeded by the Bank of  Charleston, newly chartered by  the 
state with a large capital of $2 million, which was soon increased to $3 million. 
The Bank of  the State opposed the chartering of this rival; losing the battle, 
the Bank of the State bought a large block of stock in the Bank of  Charleston 
(Lesesne 1970, 143-45).  In 1836 South Carolina also chartered the Southwest- 
ern Railroad  Bank  to  aid railroad  development, and  subscribed to  its stock 
(Schweikart 1987, 103-8;  Lesesne  1970, 145-46). 
South Carolina’s mixed fiscal interest in banking was in the profits of  the 
Bank of  the State and in bonus payments  from the chartered  private banks, 
which provided a modest annual revenue (Lesesne 1970, 149). The ownership 
interest in the Bank of the State might have been expected to lead to a restric- 
tion of competitive charters. Compared with the northeastern states, there were 
not so many independent banks in  South Carolina, but unlike the Northeast 
many of  the South Carolina banks had branches. The state’s liberal  banking 
policies after  1830, despite the investment interest in the Bank of  the State, 
appear to have resulted from the urban-rural division of labor in banking, with 
the Bank of the State intended to specialize in lending to planters. With that 
interest,  the  state had  few  objections to encouraging  chartered  commercial 
banking in centers such as Charleston. 
Virginia, the largest southern state studied here, with about half of the com- 
bined population  of  our three-state southern region between  1820 and  1860, 
was the laggard of the three in banking development. The nature of Virginia’s 
fiscal interest in its banks was once again an important factor. The state char- 
tered a small, mercantile bank in Alexandria in 1792. It was highly profitable 
to its owners, but it was transferred from Virginia’s jurisdiction  to that of  the 
District of Columbia from 1801 to 1847. 
Antibank sentiments in the state delayed a second charter until  1804, when 
the Bank of  Virginia was formed, with headquarters  (the “mother bank”) in 
Richmond and branches in three other towns. The state subscribed for one- 
fifth of the stock, made the bank’s notes acceptable for payments to the state, 
and deposited all public moneys in it. A conscious goal was to share in the 
profits of  banking, a goal furthered in  1805 by  a law banning note issues of 
unchartered private banking companies. By 18  1  1 other towns wanted banks or 
branches of  the Bank of Virginia, which the bank had up to then refused to 
open. Legislators considered several options-independent  banks, an enlarged 
Bank of Virginia, or a second mother bank with branches. The last option was 
chosen. This was in spite of  opposition and a counteroffer from the Bank of 
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would pay more to the state in 1812, and the wily legislators reasoned that the 
Bank of Virginia would pay more to have its charter renewed in  1814 than it 
was willing to pay in 18  12 to prevent the second bank from receiving a charter. 
Interestingly, a proposal was made at the time to build new roads in the state 
by  taxing  bank  capital  2 percent  per  year, but  it was  not  enacted  (Starnes 
1931,43). 
Thus  by  1812 a  pattern  was  set  that  would  control  bank  chartering  for 
decades  in  Virginia.  The state  would  charter  a  few  large,  well-capitalized 
banks  with  branches  and  would  take  large ownership  stakes in  them.  The 
state’s shares were paid for gradually as dividends accrued on them, a sort of 
tax on the private shareholders, who were also charged bonuses and required 
to make loans to the state in return for further favors.8 On terms such as these, 
the state in 1817 chartered two new mother banks with branches in the western 
part of Virginia. 
That was the  situation until  1834, when  a legislative  committee was ap- 
pointed to consider the expediency of funding internal improvements by means 
of  increasing bank capital. The committee concluded  that “the chief reason 
Virginia had not advanced as rapidly  as other states lay in the slow develop- 
ment of  her banking facilities” (Starnes  1931, 74). Despite proposals  to do 
more, the state responded with deliberate speed by  chartering one new bank 
in  1834, another in  1837, and another one in  1839. Virginia legislators were 
protecting the value of the state’s investments in banks. 
No more banks  were  chartered  until  1851, when  Virginia,  responding  to 
demands for more banking capital and the reluctance of its old banks to pro- 
vide  it, adopted  free banking.  The old banks  responded  to the competitive 
threat of free banking by expanding their capital and opening twenty-four new 
branches in the next five years. Although thirty-five free banks were granted 
charters, after the old banks expanded their operations, only thirteen went into 
operation. Virginia’s experience suggests that the threat posed by free banking 
may have mattered as much as or more than the innovation itself. 
To discharge its public debts, Virginia liquidated its bank  shares in  1856, 
which amounted to one-seventh of all the stock in the state’s banks, realizing 
$2 million from the sale (Starnes 193  1, 108). This was four decades after simi- 
lar actions by Massachusetts and Maryland, and a decade after Pennsylvania. 
Historical narrative and comparative banking data reinforce one another. The 
nature of the state’s fiscal interest in banking retarded banking development in 
Virginia for most of the antebellum era. 
4.4.3  The West 
Unlike the states of  the Northeast and the South, Ohio, Indiana, and Mis- 
souri were at different stages of settlement early in the antebellum era. This is 
8. This points to one of  the problems in interpreting the figures in table 4.2. A significant  part 
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reflected in their dates of statehood, 1803, 18  16, and 1821. For that reason no 
particular significance  should be attached to the banking data through  1830, 
a period when Ohio had two-thirds to three-quarters of the three-state sample’s 
population and an even greater proportion of its banks and bank capital. The 
changes from 1850 to 1860, however, do have significance. 
Ohio’s fiscal interest in banking began in 1815, when the state enacted a 4 
percent tax on bank dividends for revenue purposes, and, to promote a sounder 
currency, prohibited note issue by unauthorized banks. In 1816 Governor Wor- 
thington proposed to the state auditor that the state consider investing in banks 
to establish a fund to keep taxes down. The auditor, who must have been famil- 
iar with Virginia practice, responded  by  suggesting  that  when existing bank 
charters expired in  18  1 8, the state could reincorporate its banks and take one- 
fifth of their stock, which would be paid for by  means of a partial down pay- 
ment and by  future dividends on the qtock. Worthington then proposed, and 
the legislature enacted, a “bonus law” which superseded the dividend tax and 
extended bank charters, while incorporating six new banks and six old private 
banks. The state was to receive one of every twenty-five  shares issued as its 
“bonus.” Dividends on the state’s shares were to be reinvested in shares until 
the state owned one-sixth of a bank’s stock, after which dividends  would be 
paid  to the state. Seven  more banks were charted under these terms during 
1817 and 1818 (Bogart 1912, chap. 5; Huntingdon  1915,272-73). 
In  1825, after the state realized that it was receiving no revenue from the 
bonus law and that it held accounts in failed and shaky banks, it reintroduced 
the 4 percent tax on dividends. The tax was raised to 5 percent in 183  1. By the 
later  183Os, after a number  of new  banks were chartered, the tax yielded  a 
revenue of $50,000 to $70,000 a year. In the depression  of the early 184Os, 
however, two-thirds of  Ohio’s chartered banks  disappeared. An act of  1845 
reorganized the remaining banks, created a new class of independent banks, 
and, most important, founded the State Bank of Ohio, composed of branches 
all over the state and partly state-owned. 
The 1845  act replaced the dividend tax with a 6 percent tax on the net profits 
of  the  independent  banks.  Gradually,  the  favored  State Bank increased  its 
branches, while the old banks and the independent banks marked time. To meet 
the clamor for more banks, the state in I85  1 enacted a free banking law, but in 
the same year, after a dozen  free banks  appeared, a new  state constitution 
banned further free bank organizations. Heavy new taxes-later  declared un- 
constitutional by  the US. Supreme Court-were  imposed on banks in  1851 
and  1852. When the  banks  resisted,  the  state in  1852 passed  an  infamous 
“crowbar law” that allowed sheriffs to enter bank vaults by force, if necessary, 
to seize money for taxes (Huntingdon  1951, 456-59).  The crowbar law was 
later declared unconstitutional. 
After  1845 Ohio taxed the independent banks to promote its State Bank. In 
a sense the policy was successful. By 1854 thirty-seven of fifty-seven banking 
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In  1860 Ohio, which had become one of  the leading states of  the Union  in 
population, rather remarkably had a smaller share of the nation’s bank capital 
than it did when it was still a frontier state in 1820. Moreover, its share of bank 
capital in our three-state grouping for the West fell from more than two-thirds 
in 1850 to about one-third in 1860  (see tables 4.3 and 4.4). The nature of Ohio’s 
fiscal interest in banking moved it backward in banking development compared 
to other states. 
Ohio’s late antebellum history illustrates that a policy of  protecting a state 
bank from independent competitors was not a good way  to develop a state’s 
banking system. The banking histories  of  Indiana and Missouri reinforce the 
point. Neither state had much success in developing chartered banks in its fron- 
tier stage of  development, and both were without chartered private banks in 
1830.  Both  states  responded  by  chartering  a  monopoly  state  bank  with 
branches. 
Indiana’s monopoly bank  appeared in  1834 and lasted until  1857. During 
that period no other bank was to be authorized or permitted in the state. The 
state financed  its fifty percent  share of the State Bank of  Indiana by  selling 
bonds in London at 5 percent. It also loaned funds to private investors to pur- 
chase stock in the bank. These investors discharged their loans from the state 
by  applying their dividends, which averaged over 6 percent, to principal and 
interest (McCulloch 1889, 11  5). 
Hugh McCulloch, who ran a branch of  the State Bank of Indiana for many 
years and later went on to become U.S. comptroller of the currency and secre- 
tary of the treasury, was rather proud of the bank. The bank never lost a dollar, 
he said, even though it lent on real estate security. The State Bank returned a 
net profit of $3 million to Indiana, which became the basis of the state’s school 
fund: “the profits of  the bank  were large, but they were legitimate.” He did, 
however, note a possible, drawback. Early in its history the State Bank estab- 
lished thirteen branches around the state, but no more. In time “[slome towns 
in which  branches  of  the bank  were  established  were being outstripped  by 
towns  that  were  hardly  known  when  the  bank  was chartered”  (McCulloch 
1889, 120, 124). The State Bank, in other words, led the quiet life that is the 
reward of a true monopoly and did not bother to respond to credit demands 
arising in other places in  Indiana. Neither did the state, which as the  chief 
stockholder received the majority of the profits of the monopoly, until the pop- 
ular demand for free banking became irresistible in the 1850s. 
Missouri’s monopoly bank, the Bank of the State of Missouri, was similar 
to Indiana’s. The bank’s monopoly of chartered banking and note issue lasted 
for twenty  years,  from  1837 to  1857. When  the  bank  was  charted, it  was 
deemed necessary to ask a branch of an Ohio bank that operated in St. Louis 
to leave the state. The state owned about three-fourths of the stock, half of 
which  it paid  for from its share of  the federal surplus distribution  in  1837. 
Returns were handsome: dividends typically were 5 of  10 percent semiannu- 
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of the capital invested.’ Management that produced such returns had to be re- 
warded:  “The  salary  schedule was quite liberal,” wrote  the  historian of  the 
bank (Cable 1923, 207). And good salaries attracted uncommon talent; when 
money was tight in the 1850s the bank’s president “made use of his characteris- 
tic good humor and persuaded  his customers to curtail their business where 
possible, This personal trait was of untold value to the State Bank. The Demo- 
crat suggested that one could always get a smile at the State Bank even though 
loan applications might be turned down. As a whole the city was much less 
prosperous than one might guess from the condition of the State Bank” (Cable 
1923, 197). 
Growing dissatisfaction with this state of affairs prompted the legislature to 
enact a general banking law when the State Bank’s monopoly ended in  1857. 
The law contained Massachusetts’s provision of  18 12; newly chartered banks 
were to pay the state a bonus tax of  1 percent of capital each year in lieu of all 
taxes. In three years St. Louis had eight banks of issue, including the old State 
Bank, and bank  capital  had tripled. By  1860 Missouri, with  less population 
than either Ohio or Indiana, had considerably more bank capital, completely 
reversing its position a decade earlier. 
The old State Bank’s profits were greatly reduced, and the state liquidated 
its holdings after a few years. As in virtually every other state that had a shift 
of fiscal interest  from being  an owner to being a taxer, there was a marked 
change in the way banks were regulated, especially in controls on entry. 
4.5  Conclusion 
We have approached the state regulation of the banking industry in the early 
nineteenth century from a different perspective. The connection between taxa- 
tion and regulation has been ignored in the regulation and political economy 
literature. There is evidence that the way states taxed banks had important im- 
plications for the way  states regulated banks, and that the way  they regulated 
banks  had important implications for the way  they taxed banks.  States that 
taxed inputs such as bank capital had an incentive to adopt regulations (such 
as generous or free charter provision)  that maximized  the use of  that input. 
States that owned  a substantial equity  interest in banks had an incentive to 
maximize the value of that interest by restricting competition. States that had 
no fiscal interest may have been less concerned about the structure of the bank- 
ing industry than states with a fiscal interest in the banking industry. 
There is also evidence that taxation  and regulation are endogenous. New 
9. Our series on Missouri  begins  in  1849, and we  are still  working  on the early years. From 
1849 to I857 bank dividends ranged from a I0 to I7 percent return on the par  value of the state 
stock, with an exceptional return of  26 percent in 1858 when the “excess profits” of  the bank were 
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York adopted a regulatory policy of limited entry that was driven by the politi- 
cal benefits to be had from granting charters, and tax policy followed the politi- 
cal  imperatives.  When  the  political  environment  changed,  the  regulation 
changed to free banking. Maryland swung back and forth between encouraging 
and restricting entry, in part because of fiscal interest and in part to protect the 
interest of the existing  banks, particularly  in  Baltimore.  On  the other hand, 
states like Virginia and Pennsylvania clearly stated that revenue requirements 
forced them to restrict entry into banking to protect their fiscal interest in ex- 
isting banks. 
We need to rethink how political entities decide to regulate economic activ- 
ity. State governments may be “pro” or “anti” particular business interests for 
reasons that are not apparent from the identities of the historical protagonists 
in debates about the regulation. Who gains and who loses from the regulation 
will not encompass all of the relevant interests if the state’s revenues will be 
affected by the regulation. At that point every taxpayer and every person who 
receives benefits from state expenditures will be affected by the regulation. 
The implications of our investigation go well beyond the interaction of taxa- 
tion and regulation. A well-developed banking system is an important, perhaps 
critical, element in the growth of an economy. Early American states that dis- 
couraged the competitive expansion of  their banking systems may have ended 
up with slower rates of economic development.  The states themselves  were 
aware of the problem. As the quotations in the paper suggest, looking out for 
the fiscal interests of the state occasionally involved overlooking the economic 
interests of the state’s citizens. 
In this regard, traditional views about taxation are exactly wrong. States that 
taxed bank capital ended up encouraging, rather than discouraging, the bank- 
ing system to grow. States that  owned the banking  system did not acquire a 
Coasian encompassing  interest in promoting  economic growth generally. In- 
stead,  they  acquired  an  interest  in  promoting  the profits  of  the  banks they 
owned at the expense of the banking system as a whole, and perhaps, at the 
expense of more rapid growth. 
Twentieth-century perceptions about the nature of government revenues, not 
to mention the ways in which the government intervened in the economy, are 
not particularly applicable to the nineteenth century. Government was small by 
the  contemporary  standard  of  revenues  as  a  share of  income.  But  many 
nineteenth-century  governments did not rely on general revenue instruments 
like income, property, and sales taxes, the burdens of which were shared by all 
(albeit not in equal portions). Instead they utilized specific revenue instruments 
that not  only fell more  heavily  on certain  groups, but  may  have created an 
affinity  between  the government  and those  groups.  Today we usually  think 
about the relationship between taxation and the taxed in exactly the opposite 
way.  How  strange, and wonderful,  it would  be to find that  states ultimately 
promoted those activities that they taxed most heavily. 144  John Joseph Wallis, Richard E. Sylla, and John B. Legler 
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